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ABSTRACT: The nature and the role of sensation sit at the heart of classic enlightenment 
debates about the nature of knowledge.  While these debates, in their modern form, came into 
being several hundred years ago, many key words from them remain with us today.  As a result, 
a number of culturally particular assumptions also remain as part of the semantic composition 
of these words (e.g. Wierbicka 2010).  In the following, we examine such assumptions, 
particularly in relation to sensoriality.  We contrast the classic empiricist and rationalist views 
on sensation, including their broader epistemological stakes, and bring forth a third account 
through Peircean semiotics.  We suggest that the classic debate between rationalists and 
empiricists can be re-examined by asking how repetition exists in the world.  By thinking about 
the ontology of repetition, and by highlighting some of the basic semiotic principles of this, we 
suggest that sensoriality needs to be recognized as a dynamical system rather than a system that 
exists for the documenting of “what there is”.  In this account, neither sensoriality nor the 
nature of existence, including the physical world, are anchored toward absolutes on any level.  
This point, however, does not lead us toward rationalist claims about the non-importance of 
senses or the body, but toward recognition that while patterns and stability play a significant 
role in living systems, there is always room for plasticity and open-endedness.  It is in this space 
between stability and change, where meaning is brought into being. 
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INTRODUCTION – LOCATING THE MIND 
In David Lodge’s novel thinks (2002), the reader encounters a classic and a persistent 
debate about the nature of consciousness; does this phenomenon actually constitute a 
“problem”, scientific or otherwise? Besides this basic question, the novel also asks us to 
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consider – in many cases to reconsider – what are we actually talking about when we 
deploy the term "mind", and the related, equally elusive processes: sensation, 
perception, cognition. A somewhat common intellectual problem deals with linking 
these later three processes up as if existing on a linear chain, one proceeding from 
“brute physicality” of stimuli toward the presumably higher domain of cognition and 
thought, wherein we encounter still other “problems” surrounding languaging. 
In the novel, Lodge sets up a contrast between making sense of these phenomena 
through a classic, what Evan Thompson (2010) calls a 2nd wave, cognitive science 
approach or through a more classic arts/humanities approach, one in large part 
inspired by Rene Descartes’ framework of rationalism. On one level, the contrast in 
the novel highlights the problem of materiality and consequently, the location of mind 
in space and time; can we point to a set of neurological processes, for example, as 
being specific correlates of consciousness? Can we see grief being manifest on a brain 
scan? While the current cultural ethos has tilted toward locating both the mind and 
consciousness in the brain, and even though an extensive amount of brain tissue has by 
now been both sliced and diced, as well as scanned through various technologies, we 
still lack any cohesive neurologically founded explanations of either process.  
Besides focusing upon the mechanics of neurons themselves, another way of 
looking at the nature of consciousness deals with taking the phenomenon itself for 
granted, while paying attention to what can be somewhat colloquially named as 
“altered states of consciousness”. In the Lodge novel we find such approach being 
deployed by the arts and humanities perspective, wherein one takes it for granted that 
we as humans are conscious beings. Yet, this consciousness is never continuous or 
complete, and consequently, it is the gaps between what we are able to notice that are 
more interesting to interrogate and reflect upon rather than the more mundane, 
quotidian conscious perception.  
Interestingly the latter case aligns with classic anthropological approaches to 
consciousness that have examined such altered states of consciousness in ritual and 
trance while, generally speaking, giving sparse conceptual attention to the unmarked, 
quotidian experiences of everyday consciousness. This situation might in part be a 
reflection of the somewhat humanist bias of classic anthropology. More recent turns 
toward 'post-humanity' in anthropology take a more critical distance to that 
humanistic bias, however (e.g. Kohn 2013). With this post-human turn, we are 
interested to see how consciousness itself might also become re-examined by 
anthropologists in the future.  
Like classic anthropology, the novel Thinks is (culturally) Cartesian in its treatment 
of these topics, for example, in the sense of what is being left out from this account and 
what is thereby being taken for granted. While the novel approaches many of the key 
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issues through highly nuanced exchanges crafted between two main characters—a 
cognitive scientist and a novelist—what is not addressed is the issue of existence or ‘the 
world itself,’ or what English speakers commonly refer to as the ‘Real’. In other words, 
the overall positionality of the organism itself, whether a human or a bat, who 
experiences and engages with these processes of knowing and perceiving is left out.  
Consequently, what such a conceptual move does, whether accomplished through 
literature, philosophy, or science, is that it dramatically simplifies the issue of 
sensation/perception, leaving it secondary to the presumably “higher” processes of 
mind/cognition. Maybe more importantly, sensation becomes frozen as static 
phenomena, in an analogous fashion to how in linguistics semantics can be regarded 
as being “frozen pragmatics”. 
In the following, we trace these Cartesian based accounts of sensation that are 
founded upon a number of classic dualisms, such as the distinction between an 
organism and the environment, often aimed at maintaining an epistemologically 
convenient clear-cut split between what is on the inside of us and what consequently 
resides somehow outside of us, or “out there in the world”.  
By re-examining the issue of sensation in relation to the broader question of the 
mind and consciousness, we will address the basic, yet persistent question of 
materiality and meaning in living systems. 
SENSATION: MORE THAN DOCUMENTING THE EXTERNAL  
In many scientific accounts, a number of explicitly cultural and historically particular 
assumptions about sensation are present. One such basic assumption deals with the 
enumeration of sensory modalities, which in many current frameworks and colloquial 
expressions remains centered upon the almost mythical number five (Howes 2003, 
Geertz 2002) 
Conversely, the conventional semantic composition of the notion of a “sixth sense” 
evokes a linguistically marked sense of a less established process, something explicitly 
out of the ordinary. 
Yet a closer examination of sensation as a process suggests up to 30 distinct sensory 
modalities to be in existence – among humans alone (Howes 2009). The main question 
of interest for us doesn’t so much concern the issue of how many senses there might 
“really” be, but rather, how and why does the cultural notion of there being only five 
senses persist so robustly through history? Furthermore, other central questions deal 
with the epistemological challenges that this cultural logic toward sensation maintains.  
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THE CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE SENSES AS INSTRUMENTS FOR KNOWING  
Looking at the issue historically, one finds a great deal of conceptual disagreement 
placed upon the importance or the non-importance of sensorial/perceptive processes 
in relation to the (presumably) broader domain of epistemology, or knowledge itself. 
Yet even such disagreements, for example as cast between the rationalists—inspired by 
Descartes—and the empiricists (following Locke and Hume), make a number of 
similar assumptions about sensation that help to maintain the classic number five, a 
number that to some degree was established by the ancient Greeks and later recycled 
back into the Enlightenment debates.  
The Rationalists wanted us to distrust sensorially based knowledge while the 
empiricists made sensorial documentation the very foundation of the Real. What both 
frameworks share however, is the basic assumption that sensoriality is a process 
oriented toward the external world, toward documenting what there really is 
(empiricists) or by being misled in our thinking because these sensorial imprints of the 
world can only be partial at best and simply hallucinations at their worst (rationalists). 
In other words, both theories make the assumption that the human being can be 
conceptually separated from ‘the world itself’ in a meaningful way.  
For Descartes, the human can attain true knowledge—to know the world as it 
really truly is—not through the senses, for they are fallible, even presenting us with 
hallucinations—but through the powers of the mind; thinking, logic, and mathematics 
are the only central foundations of rational thought within this framework.  
For the empiricists, we can only know anything at all if it is first sensorially 
documented. Indeed, the British philosophical tradition of empiricism as a central 
conceptual movement in the 1700s helped congeal central enlightenment ideals into 
the emerging scientific frameworks. As Raymond Williams noted, at the heart of this 
philosophical movement is the “old association between experience and experiment” 
(1983:116). While the term "experience" itself can be open toward a range of differing 
perceptual encounters, including those that are not distinctly grounded in material or 
energetic properties of the world (e.g. a spiritual or an aesthetic event), once 
experience is coupled with experimentation, a more narrow range of parameters is at 
play; namely, a more explicit focus upon capturing the essence of phenomena through 
materiality alone.  
The Newtonian based world of existence therefore came to center upon the "brute 
facts" of existence. In these accounts, certainty and objectivity became highly valued 
cultural ideals (Daston 2007). 
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REPETITION: THE PERPETUALLY NEW OR THE SAME OLD? 
We’ll now address the issue of sensoriality through a more general level question about 
repetition itself: when and how can the same be “the same”. In other words, this 
question deals with ontological aspects of repetition: how does repetition or "the same" 
exist in the world? 
Before proceeding, it is worthwhile to frame the term ontology itself in a more 
detailed manner, particularly as it has gained broad circulation across a number of 
disciplines in recent decades. 
ONTOLOGY AS A CONCEPT 
The domains of epistemology, metaphysics, and ontology have classically been the 
purview of philosophy. Interestingly two of these terms, or philosophically speaking, 
areas of specialization, epistemology and ontology, have in recent decades travelled to 
a number of fields, including both across humanities and social sciences, in some cases 
also appearing within natural sciences. As a basic definitional distinction, epistemology 
deals with the overall domain of knowledge—what is "good" (e.g. "defendable" or 
"rational") knowledge and what are the methods or general premises of attaining such 
knowledge. Ontology on the other had is centered upon the basic question of 
existence, of “what there is”. Yet, in order to ask any question about the existence of 
things, one of the immediate questions leads us right back into the domain of 
knowledge itself: how do we know what exists, and conversely then, what is it that does 
not exist. One the ways in which classic enlightenment thinkers aimed to sort out these 
questions is by establishing distinctions such as “mind independent” vs. “mind 
dependent” realms of existence, categories that in some cases became further aligned 
with the distinction between "natural" and "supernatural". In most reductionist 
accounts the "natural" or the mind-independent domain is “all there really is” in terms 
of overall parameters of existence. One such grand historical shift occurred when the 
medieval cosmological account, the Great Chain of Being, became replaced during 
the enlightenment with naturalist taxonomies, such as Linnaean taxonomy: a shift 
from an organic worldview toward an increasingly mechanical worldview (Capra 
2014:19). 
Both anthropologists and historians of science have documented the ways in which 
these conceptual issues, when being played out in the scope of social life, were 
blatantly colored by political and ethical issues (Daston 2007, Marks 2011, Bauman and 
Briggs 2003). It is a common pattern across social life that core questions about the 
existence of things are also distinctly political questions, still today, simply on the basic 
level that those who are cast as being outside the modern, "rational" accounts are in 
some instances categorized as “savage” or as “crazy”; either one is somehow stuck in 
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the past, for example, being “blinded” by a given cultural tradition which does not 
allow one to grasp the world for what it really is or, one as an individual is lacking 
something in themselves, such as sanity. In either case, significant institutional 
consequences have historically followed as a result of such classifications, again 
stemming in part from these foundational philosophical, and today, increasingly 
“evidence based” claims about the true existence of things. 
One of the particular ways in which a paradigmatic approach to the questions of 
existence emerged through empiricism, is the focus upon materiality that this 
philosophical movement takes. Again, such focus came into being as a result of the 
previously existing debates about the role of sensoriality within the broader domain of 
knowledge, here the focus being on the overall notion that ‘seeing is believing’ 
(Anderson and Pettinen 2014). Any philosophical movement directly influenced by 
empiricism consequently came to maintain that without a sensorial stimulation 
present, which then can be perceived by a human or through various technologies that 
further expand human sensorial range, there simply was no ‘true’ existence. In other 
words, the realm of ontology came to be centered, at least common-sensically, upon 
materiality being at its core. As such, besides setting up the modern vs. primitive 
contrast, empiricist philosophy also comes to later establish the “two cultures” (Snow 
1959) of academia, or the distinction between sciences and the humanities (e.g. 
Hernstein-Smith 2005:12).  
Given that the overall epistemological foundations of the west have tilted toward 
materiality, to posit an “ontological” account of repetition—an abstraction not an 
entity to begin with—is to already make a somewhat particular claim about the nature 
of existence, namely that existence is in part conceptual and cannot be captured 
through material or energetic parameters alone. Such an account can be grounded 
through various theoretical perspectives, including idealism and various post-
structuralist movements that followed it in the course of the 20th century. However, in 
our case, we do not follow these latter conceptual movements, mainly because they 
have no ability to account for materiality while placing too much faith in 
representational processes. Another way to make the basic ontological claim that 
materiality alone cannot account for existence, while also recognizing that materiality 
is highly significant, is through Peircean semiotics, or systems theory, for example as 
brought forth recently by Fritjof Capra (2014). What both of these frameworks share, is 
the ability to account for constraints and patterns, but in an open-ended manner that 
leaves room for dynamism rather than being caught within the overtly mechanical 
enlightenment cosmology.  
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 220 
THE ONTOLOGY OF REPETITION 
Heraclitus classically stated—or has been reported to state, as might more accurately 
be the case—“one cannot step into the same river twice". In such articulation, the 
world is fundamentally regarded as being in a state of flux; all being is also becoming. 
In the words of semiotician Floyd Merrell; "everything is becoming something else 
than what it was previously becoming" (2010). In Merrell’s view then, all "things"(for 
convenience, we can focus upon material objects but the same applies to concepts and 
ideas) are interdependent, interrelated, and interconnected.  
Along these lines, identical reproduction of anything as precisely itself is not 
possible—ontologically speaking. From the semiotic perspective that Merrell, following 
Peirce, highlights even inert objects are always in the process of becoming something 
else than what they previously were, because even their existence is within a particular 
context, within a particular set of relations that themselves cannot be stable. Of course, 
the issues of context are rather broad as they can be recognized differently, including 
on grander evolutionary scales of existence: evolutionary deep time in no way respects 
human accounts of the world’s becoming. Yet when shifting the perspective from 
ontology toward subjectivity we can locate a contrasting way of thinking about 
repetition and sameness. 
Specifically, if we place focus on the sensorial and perceptive ways in which 
organisms exist in the word, in other words, upon our embodied ways of being and 
existing as individuals, we can note that the moment we recognize something, we have 
treated it as the same on some level. In other words, we have conceptually made a 
categorical move and shifted from particularity toward abstraction. 
The classic empiricists get epistemologically great mileage out of the basic 
observation that in some instances things fundamentally are "the same". This is the 
case because empiricism as a framework maintains a number of particular assumptions 
about the world, which lead toward a coherent stable reality existing “out there”. 
These two points of focus—sensoriality and reality—are somewhat circular 
cosmologically, both supporting each other: "if it really is there I can see it; if I can see 
it, it really is there." Therefore, in certain epistemological interpretations the claim that 
repetition does have a distinct ontology might lead one back to regarding sensoriality 
simply as a means of documenting that which exists, "mind independently" as it were. 
In the following, however, we will take a differing interpretation toward such 
ontological claim. 
Another way of looking at the question of how repetition exists in the world stems 
from taking a different stance toward sensoriality as compared to the one adopted by 
empiricism. Here, we can contrast the fully dynamic account of the world and of 
existence (a semiotically grounded ontology) and the fact that when living organisms 
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engage with such a world they all encounter moments of fundamental familiarity; they 
recognize things, they remember things, they re-encounter a range of “the same” 
through various sensorial modalities. 
The main reason for such encounters of familiarity deals with a fundamental 
feature of living systems, that of memory and of learning. In essence, what constitutes 
learning across biological systems is the ability to perceive similarities across sensorial 
feedbacks. We can be reminded of Gregory Bateson’s basic account of information 
being “a difference that makes a difference”; the living organism recognizes something 
as familiar or "the same" precisely because such recognition is in some ways significant 
within the context of its Umwelt (Uexkull, 1957)—within its species-specific ways of 
perceiving and being in the world. Echoing these notions, philosopher of science, 
Isabelle Stengers further reminds us that, “learning does not mean imitation” 
(2003:31).  
When we place the focus upon embodied learning, a process that is ongoing, 
something never to be completed, sensoriality can be highlighted as a means of 
engaging with the world, within the world, rather than a set of “information” 
gathering devices that document "what there is". This account of sensation as a means 
of engagement allows us to more readily recognize internal sensorial events such as 
balance, hunger, or thirst, as being distinct sensorial modalities in their own right. 
Furthermore, if we also take into account what we have referred to in the above as 
semiotic ontology—a position that emphasizes the dynamical state of all systems, 
whether living or non-living—we can take this point a bit further. Rather than leading 
us toward any epistemological angst about whether we can really, truly know the 
nature of the world (we can altogether bracket the solipsist doubts of rationalism: 
whether the world, including other people, actually exists) we can instead recognize 
that our understanding is always already situated and ongoing. It is the case both that 
the world itself acts upon our knowledge, our understanding—we can’t just "make it 
all up"—while it is also true that our knowledge systems themselves act upon the world 
and impact the manner in which we come to understand given parameters of the 
world. 
As a whole, the broader argument about ontology is this: there is no way to truly 
separate subjectivity from existence. In other words, this claim challenges the 
distinction between mind-independent vs. mind-dependent realms of existence as 
being meaningful. It is indeed such a perspective that arguably led toward the rise of a 
“disenchanted” universe. A semiotically founded ontology includes the subjective 
aspects of existence, in short because if we are to recognize living organisms as active 
interpreters of their particular environments, their Umwelt, in contrast to being 
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fundamentally driven by a set of codes, we also have to recognize subjectivity in our 
accounts of existence and being (also see Varela, Thompson 1993, Deacon 2011). 
THE TENSION: BETWEEN DYNAMISM AND STABILITY  
In the last section we emphasized the view that from the perspective of life, or living 
systems as a whole, repetition has no ontology, you indeed cannot step into the same 
river twice. Things are open-ended, life is filled with digital plasticity and analogue 
elasticity, dynamism is both local inductive rule and global deductive law. The 
creativity that violates yet energizes tame expectations from inductive and deductive 
patterns would be the wild or less predictable abduction, the utterly new.  
However, from the perspective of an individual organism’s life span, repetition or 
sameness emerges through perceptive processes. In order for habits to form, whether 
functionally, behaviorally, or perceptively, some previously dynamical process needs to 
be treated as a stable phenomenon.  
Among non-human animals such processes of learning became conventionally 
catalogued under various notions of “instinct”. The conceptual tendency for this was 
in part lodged into place by Descartes, and by other humanists sharing a paradigm of 
human exceptionalism; the main attribute assumed exceptional was the soul that only 
humans were thought to posses. The soul as a categorical prerequisite equipped the 
human agent with various capacities that were otherwise denied from other living 
organisms, including language, mind, and sentience—even human children were 
assumed deficient and incapable of feeling pain. In part, these considerations underlay 
Haeckl's adage proposing that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. 
In the course of the 20th century, the framework of natural selection became 
operationalized, initially through the concept of a gene, later through the concept of 
DNA, and now often the unit of analysis is the genome/epigenome, while more 
recently also holobiome (Guerrero, Margulis and Berlanga 2013) and even ecobiome 
have emerged as possible units of evolutionary analysis. 
In time the “blueprint” of DNA coded for all further behaviors down the line, 
regardless of the –ome in question (a notable exception is Guerrero et al 2013). This 
would leave little or no room for any actual amount of learning to take place—apart 
from something like “operant conditioning”—except among the humans, now the 
supposed possessors of culture, rather than the more medieval notion of a soul. The 
logic of course, hadn’t changed much. 
Recognizing the strong historical roots for such human exceptionalist accounts, we 
can still talk about some of the ways in which repetition as a phenomenon is brought 
into particular modes of existence as a result of human history and culture, including 
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through scientifically grounded epistemology. Among humans there are a number of 
patterns that, for better or worse, amplify the broader tilt of learning, present in living 
organisms at large, toward perceiving, and actively seeking, patterns in nature and 
thus creating a sense of repetition.  
As a whole, in this paper we work from the overall tension between the non-
ontology of repetition, of taking the cosmos as being in a through and through 
dynamic state of becoming, and the inevitability of living organisms return and 
recognition of something as the same. 
EPISTEMOLOGIES OF VALUE 
On many levels, the story of western modernity intensifies the processes of replication, 
in part through a set of technological developments, such as the phonetically-based 
alphabet, mechanical printing and mass production of texts. At the same time, a 
number of these developments took place on representational and epistemological 
levels.  
The core epistemological shift—in many ways, the very story of western 
modernity—centers on the development of scientific approaches to knowledge 
systems. The scientific modes of knowing, in large part culturally formalized in the 
Anglo-American tradition through the philosophical framework of empiricism, came 
to center on approximating the “true” aspects of the external world. One can note the 
ways in which this project emerges out of the broader social orders of capitalism and 
imperialism, systems that benefitted from a strict separation between the so called 
“civilized” and “primitive” modes of knowing. In short, the civilized came to be 
positioned as those able to recognize that something referred to as reality in-and-of-
itself exists and can be set apart from the realm of the so-called supernatural, as well as 
from the realm of human subjective, and hence variable, experience. Furthermore, 
"truth" then is the domain that truly sets the civilized further apart, mainly being the 
publicly shared, reliable, demonstration of this reality—via autoptic witnessing and 
show-and-tell evidence, privileging the visual. 
It is in such epistemologies wherein replication emerges as a higher good of its own 
kind, something to work for, something to achieve, for example, through a set of 
highly controlled procedures of a laboratory. Here innovation and creativity become 
modes of methodological performance; the ability to establish those kinds of 
procedures that will yield a consistent and one-to-one objective picture of the world 
and nature. The universal, the singular, the causal; the highest order of knowing being 
a universal law and certainty.  
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THE WORLD AS AN ILLUSION 
Another strand of scientific modeling, rising from contemporary neuro- and cognitive 
sciences, is the account of viewing the world (as experienced by humans) inherently as 
an illusion, specifically one “created” by the human brain. While being now 
articulated in contemporary scientific contexts, these accounts echo the philosophical 
anxieties raised by Cartesian solipsism: how does one really know if the world as 
perceived by the self, more specifically everyone else except the self, is just an illusion 
of some kind? As both Alva Noe and Eduardo Kohn have pointed out, such Cartesian 
solipsism can emerge only through a thoroughly disembodied logic. If we actually 
acknowledge the presence of the body and sensoriality, and further recognize that we 
exist through such modes of embodiment, we cannot disregard the actual and 
inevitable existence of both ourselves and of others, all of us already within the world. 
In a sense, the basic argument that both Noe and Kohn touch on, is that while 
scientific realism came to take a very close and detailed account of living systems – it 
paid attention to materiality – it did so through a number of Cartesian tenets that 
became imbedded into the Enlightenment scientific systems. As a result, all biological 
systems, including the human body, came to be viewed mechanically, systems "dumb" 
and prone to error. 
More specifically however, current neurological accounts are centered on findings 
that supposedly demonstrate the limits of human perceptive capacities; that the world 
over and over presents itself to us in a manner that doesn’t correspond with notions of 
a singular assessable reality, a “world-in-itself” in Eugene Thacker’s words. In 
somewhat obvious ways, the prevailing scientific paradigms here elevate the domain of 
physical and material reality, the world (presumably) “out there” rather than the social 
intersubjective domain that the Cartesian based problem of solipsism was centered 
upon. Furthermore, rather than letting go, or even reconsidering the actual 
productivity of the moniker “reality” itself, these models come up against the plasticity 
of our perception through various case studies, such as the rubber hand phenomenon, 
McGurcke effect, change or inattentional blindness, and color perception, casting all 
such phenomenon at times as sensorial “illusions”. To categorize dominant human 
ways of sensing and perceiving as illusions should on some level cast questions back 
toward the nature of the assumptions present in such categorizations in the first place 
(Noe 2009).  
What can be highlighted here are the ways in which the accounts of a world as an 
illusion are indexical of the epistemologies that are premised upon valuing repetition, 
for example as a pathway toward certainty. Such scientific paradigms do very well on 
the pole of reliability, yet cannot but to lose validity through such focus. Furthermore, 
a number of core questions about the state of ecology or human health cannot be 
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directly addressed through a set of experimental procedures in the first place, in other 
words, replicability is not all there is even to scientific certainty (Sarewitch 2015). 
CONCLUSION 
Rather than regarding the human ways of perceiving the world as an illusion, we 
suggest that a more productive, as well as a more evolutionarily grounded way, is to 
recognize that both ends of the pole here are in a dynamical relation to each other. On 
the one hand, the world itself (the nature of existence) is a dynamical system, one 
always in the state of becoming something else than what it previously was becoming, 
even if such changes are in many ways subtle. On the other hand, living organism’s 
subjective ways of being in such a world resonate with such dynamism. While 
sensorial/perceptive processes need to be able to take into account the patterned, 
structural aspects of the world – every moment cannot be radically new! – they also 
need to be able to correspond with the ways in which such patterns and structures 
exist both within particular contexts and within particular sets of relations. This double 
dynamical recognition allows us to respect the key features of life that make it an 
engagement with meaning on all levels of existence; plasticity and open-endedness. 
The core value that then emerges epistemologically is not that of certainty but that of 
relative stability.  
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